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A CENTURY OF A PHANTOM
PANSLAVISM AND THE WESTERN SLAVS

by S. Harrison Thomson

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AMONG the gorgeous phantoms of history, none has had a more rich or variously enticing story than Panslavism. It may well be that more literate Europeans have enjoyed the thrill of frightening themselves by it and more designing political manipulators have used it as a stage illusion than would be true of any other fiction. On the other hand there have been published several serious histories of the spectre.

By 1848 Panslavism was already an old and ripe story. To go back to the empire of Samo in the early seventh century is perhaps to be too inventive, but we can certainly trace the idea of Slavic reciprocity in the plans of Boleslaw Chrobry (the Hardy) of Poland, who, around the year 1000, planned a western Slavic empire comprising the Poles, the Czechs, the Moravians, the Elbian Slavs and the western Ukrainians. His obvious purpose was to block further German expansion eastward.[1] Whatever their motivation, those grandiose plans proved ephemeral, as did others conceived by Polish or Czech rulers for centuries thereafter. There is no discernible difference, so far as we can judge, between the territorial and dynastic maneuvering that went on among Slavic princes and that of Austrian, Hungarian and Wallachian rulers in these centuries of the formation of national states. One Slavic people was as likely to be antipathetic to a neighboring Slavic people as to a neighbor who was Germanic or Turco-Ugric. Territorial nationalism or dynastic combination were already the prevailing patterns.

But from the seventeenth century on concepts of a common ethnic and linguistic background begin to grow and take shape. From the Croat Juraj Križanić in the seventeenth century,[2] who spent fifteen years in Siberian exile after proclaiming his Panslav ideas in Russia, to the great Slovak poet, Jan Kollár, in the early nineteenth century, we can trace an unwavering line of western Slavic intellectuals who formulated and reformulated the idea of a glorious Slav race which should of right be united in heart and body, preferably under one paternal Slav ruler.

Somewhat ironically a Baltic German, Johann Gottfried Herder, had contributed much to the most recent upsurge of this Slav feeling by glori-

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1 On whom the classic study is St. Zakrzewski, *Boleslaw Chrobry Wielki* (Cracow, 1925); and cf. more recently, Z. Wojciechowski, "Boleslaw Chrobry i kryzys stosunków polskoniemieckich" in *Przegląd Zachodni* IV (1948), 369-383.

2 Smurlo, E., "From Križanić to the Slavophiles," *Slavonic Review* VI (1928), 321-335; cf. A. Fischel, *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1919), p. 20ff.; P. G. Scalardi, *Krijanich, messager de l'unité des chrétiens et ève du panslavisme* (Paris, 1947).

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175 fying the Slavic race and treating it as one, from the Moldau to the Urals.
186 He would doubtless have been disturbed to be credited with partial parent-
668 hood of both Pangermanism and Panslavism. Early in the nineteenth
829 century most western Slavs were of necessity romantics. Romanticism was the only recourse left them: Poland tragically partitioned, the Slavs of the Austrian Empire barely existing under Metternich, the South Slavs predominantly under the Ottoman Turk. Any voice even faintly suggesting a prouder past, and by implication a comparable future, would be welcome. Their history was their refuge and their hope in time of troubled humiliation.[3]

Philology, poetry and letters, history and the trend of international events in the forties of the nineteenth century all combined to deepen and broaden the feelings but dimly and sporadically aroused a half century before by the wildfire spread of the ideas of the French Revolution. There was now, after decades of scholarship, scientific and historical ground for the concept of Slavic community. The ferment of the Slav Revival, however, romantic it may have been in a technical sense, was a psychological fact of great moment to all the western Slavs, whether living under Magyar repression in Slovakia or Croatia, clumsy Austrian Biedermeier in Bohemia, or awkward Hapsburg pampering in Galicia. The springs of hope and confidence were filling. The single great Slavic state to the east—Mother Russia—was still victoriously radiant from defeating Napoleon, and her very glamor drew irresistibly the yearnings of the Slavic millions enslaved by alien peoples. In many quarters among the western Slavs there was talk of the all-Slavic Tsar, while in Russia there was not infrequently an expression of interest among scholars and publicists as well as among reflective politicians in the possibility of strengthening the natural bonds between Mother Russia and her temporarily estranged children in the west. Pushkin's lines, written after the Polish revolution of 1830-31

> Will the Slavic rivulets pour into the Russian sea,
> Or will it dry up? That is the question.

reflected current Russian thought.[4] A. S. Chomyakov, the Slavophil poet,

[3] See the illuminating discussion of Panslavism by Wacław Lednicki in *European Ideologies* (New York, 1948), pp. 808-951, particularly rich in literary background. His earlier study, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea," *Slavonic Review* VII (1928-29), 128-140, 649-662, can also be consulted with great profit. It is significant that this study of Polish Slavophilism ends about the middle of the nineteenth century. See also W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej w okresie przebiorowym*. I (Lwów, 1913) *passim*. For the echoes of this current of thought in Polish literature, and an explanation of how and why it took a line divergent from that in othe. Western and Southern Slavic countries see Zofja Klamerowna, *Słowianofilstwo w literaturze polskiej lat 1800 do 1848* (Warszawa, 1926), *passim*.

[4] See Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 168ff., and Lednicki *passim*. The literature on Russian

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in the next year spoke dramatically of "the brothers in fetters, who wait yearningly for thy call and thy protective embrace." There was much more, a good deal of it more effusive, and all of it tinged with theology, from poets, essayists and even historians, but mostly urging the western Slavs, and particularly the Poles, to recognize their divinely appointed lot as part of a great Slavic nation, naturally under Russian leadership. The Slovak Kollár's "On Slavic Reciprocity" was first published in German in 1837, then appeared in Russian in 1838 and a second time in 1840, but the concept of reciprocity was interpreted by the Russian editor and Russian readers in a Russian sense.[5] It would be difficult to determine whether the Russian espousal of Slavophilism was more or less enthusiastic than that of the western Slavs in the period before 1848, but it is certain that Russian Slavophilism could, even at this early date, be more properly called Panrussism than Panslavism.

We can indeed thus early discern a fairly clear and perhaps radical split in the aims of those who supported Slavic unity. On the one hand the western Slavs thought in terms of reciprocal aid, comfort and support, implicitly and explicitly favoring the independent existence of the several Slavic peoples. On the other hand the Russian Slavophils, from their proud vantage-point of an independent state existence, regarded the lesser Slavic peoples beyond their borders as strayed, lost or stolen children who should return to the mother's heart and hearth, the mother of course being Russia. Their principal concern, indeed, was that Russia herself should perceive her providential mission to carry on the torch of the true Christian faith which was visibly falling from the hand of the weakening West. It was taken for granted that the errant western and southern Slav brethren would accept the new situation with appreciation and even enthusiasm.

Decades of Romanticism, the European enlightenment followed by three-quarters of a century of Slavic renaissance in philology, poetry, ethnography, history and science, has made the dispersed Slavic peoples very sensible of their similarities and their differences, and eager to grasp and hold their own future. The events of February 1848 in western Europe only precipitated these feelings into action. German nationalism had found its voice in the Frankfurt Parliament. It was only natural that the western Slavs should answer with a Slavic assembly. In April the Slovak Ljudevit Štur was agitating in Prague for a meeting of representatives of the Slavic

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Slavophilism is tremendous. Of the more recent literature in western languages, see Charles Quénet, *Tchaadaev et les lettres philosophiques* (Paris, 1931); A. Gratieux, *A. S. Khomiakov et le mouvement slavophile*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1939); Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa* (Bern, 1948); and Bernhard Schultze, *Russische Denker* (Vienna, 1950).

[5] Clementis, Vl., *Panslavism Past and Present* (London, 1943), p. 38.

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peoples, and Dr. Fr. Brauner received a letter from Ondrzej Moraczewski in Poznań, dated April 23, inviting the Czechs to initiate a Slavic congress.[6] But the first public suggestion to this effect came from the Croat Ivan Kukuljević in the April 20 issue of the *Narodni Noviny*, and a revised call to meet was published on April 30 in the same paper over the signature of Palacký and 19 other leading Czechs.[7] A public statement was issued on May 5 to "our brothers of the Austrian Empire" inviting them to convene in Prague on May 31, in order "to deliberate on our common interests ... We are resolved to remain faithful to the hereditary house of Habsburg-Lorraine ... and to maintain the integrity and independence of the Empire by all means in our power. We therefore reject all accusations of separatism, of Panslavism, of Russianism, which might be brought against us by ill-intentioned accusers.... Our undertaking is essentially conservative in nature and should in no wise disturb our liberal and justice-loving non-Slavic fellow-citizens." This was the voice of Austro-Slavism.

Of the 340 participants, 237 were Czechs and Slovaks, 42 South Slavs, 60 Poles and Ruthenians, and one Russian. Of the Poles several were from Prussian Poland, and the Russian—Bakunin—did not officially represent Tsarist Russia. The very thought of revolution of any sort was uncongenial to Tsar Nicholas I. The Poles would have preferred to have the Congress declare for a restitution of all of Poland, but there was little support for so revolutionary a concept.[8] The ruling motivation was anti-German and anti-Magyar. It was certainly not pro-Russian. Bakunin, the sole Russian present, a voluble guest, was quite un-Russian in his advocacy of Slavic federation.[9] The enthusiasm was tearful and tremendous, the speeches were moving, the parades, dinners and celebrations were elaborate and mystic. Palacký's speech of June 12, resuming the conclusions of the several commissions, specifically demanded a federalized Empire, with Slavs enjoying equal rights and privileges with the Germans and the

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[6] Tobolka, Zd., *Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 až do dnešní doby*, I (Prague, 1931), 77.

[7] Published in J.M. Černy, *Boj za právo* I (Prague, 1893), 183 and F. Palacký, *Spisy z oboru politiky* (Prague, 1898), p. 24f. See also F. Roubík, *Český rok 1848* (Prague, 1948), p. 199, and K. Kazbunda, *České hnutí roku 1848* (Prague, 1929), p. 182ff.; Albert Pražák, "Slavonic Congress of 1848 and the Slovaks" in *Slavonic Review* VII (1928-29), 141-159.

[8] Batowski, Henryk, *Współpraca słowiańska* (Warsaw, 1946), p. 53. See also W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej* I (Lwów, 1913) 288-291.

[9] *Bakuninová Zpověď* (Prague, 1926), p. 72ff.; see also B. P. Hepner, *Bakounine et le panslavisme révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1950), pp. 236-284; and on Bakunin's Panslavism and his participation in the Prague Congress see V. Cejchan, *Bakunin v Čechách* (Prague, 1928), pp. 14-30. It seems quite clear that Bakunin had little or no understanding of the orientation of the Slavs of the Hapsburg monarchy.

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Magyars.[10] This was the last plenary session of the Congress. Tumultuous events in Prague, not directly connected with the Slav Congress, made further meetings impossible, and on June 28 it was adjourned *sine die*.[11] An attempt was made to carry on the work of the Congress through a society bearing the name *Lipa slovanská* (the Slavic linden tree), but it did not survive the reaction that set in the next year. There remained, however, for a few years, one insistently free voice. Karel Havlíček, one of Palacký's adjutants at the Congress, refused to be quiet, and through his journal *Slovan* continued, for the two years he was relatively unsilenced, to defend the rights of the Slavs in the Hapsburg Empire, and went so far as to warn Vienna: "If they will not allow the lesser Panslavism in Central Europe they should take care lest the greater crash on their necks."[12] This is especially suggestive in view of the fact that Havlíček had but recently returned from a trip to Poland and Russia completely cured of any pro-Russian sentiments.[13] There was no western Slav who spoke more frankly than this in the early 'fifties.

Thus as of 1849, Austro-Slavism had apparently had its day within the Hapsburg Empire, and Tsar Nicholas I, after reading the statements written out by Ivan Aksakov in answer to a police questionnaire, wrote in the margin of Aksakov's plaidoyer two comments: "Under the guise of compassion for the pseudo-persecution of Slavic tribes there is hidden a criminal thought about an uprising against the constituted authority of neighboring and partly allied states and about a general unification, which is expected, not from God's will, but from a revolution, which is perilous to Russia." "Only God can determine what is being prepared in the distant future, but if an accumulation of circumstances would indeed lead to such

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10 Palacký, Fr., *Spisy z oboru politiky*, p. 46ff.

11 Roubík, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

12 Quoted in Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 307f. See Karel Tuma, *Karel Havlíček Borovský* (Prague, 1883) who follows the development of Havlíček's thought in these years with extensive quotations from his letters and editorials. In addition to T. G. Masaryk's classic work, *Karel Havlíček* (Prague, 1896), see the more recent work of Jaromír Bělič, *Karel Havlíček Borovský a slovanstvo* (Prague, 1947), especially pp. 27ff. and 180ff. This latter section is particularly illuminating in its analysis of the changes of attitude Havlíček went through toward the Poles, the Russians and Slavism in general.

13 Jirásek, J., *Rusko a my* II (Prague, 1946), 161f.; Tuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 71ff., 92ff. Havlíček saw no reason to modify his unfavorable opinion of Russia even after the failure of the Congress and the onset of reaction. He wrote in the August 30, 1848 issue of his issue of his *Národní Noviny* (quoted by Tuma, *op. cit.*, p. 234f.): "If Russia were a free constitutional country the Austrian Slavs (in case Austria were to be broken up), could consider a union with their blood brethren like the Germans, the Magyars or the Wallachs. They would then be a part of one of the most honorable, and perhaps leading countries of the world. But Russia is a land of despotism, and the rest of us free Slavs must, unfortunately, consider this our brother as our worst enemy."

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unification, it would be for the peril of Russia."[14] Not only did the Tsar disapprove of Slavophilism, but the presence of Russian armies in Slovakia as allies of Habsburg repression in the same year did not encourage Slavophilism among the western Slavs.

For the better part of a decade, both among the western Slavs and within Russia little is heard of Panslavism or even of Slavophilism. The interest of the Russian intellectuals was taken up, in these years, by the polemics focussed around the question of the relations of the Orthodox to the Roman church. The encyclical of Pius IX to the Eastern Christians set off the sharp dispute.[15] In the Empire the reaction of Bach was severely anti-Slav,[16] and Tsar Nicholas would not hear any talk of Slav federation. But the end of the Crimean war, coinciding with the death of Nicholas I and the end of his absolutism, heralded a change in the Russian attitude toward the lesser Slavic breeds beyond the pale. Russia defeated was more receptive to ideas of Slavic reciprocity than before. But to the western Slavs, for a time at least, the shock of Russia's military vulnerability was a bitter disillusionment.[17] This feeling of despair lasted for a number of years until Austria herself was humbled on the plains of Lombardy. Then hope welled anew. Bach's régime was through and Vienna was a suitor for the support of her Slavic peoples. It is not without interest that at about the same time, 1857 and 1858, a Slavic Benevolent Committee was organized in Moscow,[18] and the Foreign Minister, Prince Gorchakov, gave it his blessing. Its benevolence was preeminently directed toward strengthening cultural and ecclesiastical ties with the southern Slavs, particularly the Bulgars. The Tsarevitch was the patron. The list of the founders of the Committee included all the living Slavophils, of both currents—the romantic Panslavists and those we must henceforth call Panrussians. The significance of the junction of these two currents cannot be missed. This date may in fact be taken as a convenient dividing line between the earlier theoretical, romantic, Muscovite Slavophilism, best represented by the poet Chomyakov, the two Kireyevskys, Samarin and Konstantin Aksakov, and the later political Panslavism which should properly be called Panrussism.[19]

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[14] *Ivan Sergeyevich Aksakov v yego pismakh* I, ii (Moscow, 1888), 154-55, 160. I am indebted to Professor Leonid I. Strakhovsky for this quotation.

[15] von Schelting, A., *op. cit.*, p. 147ff.

[16] Denis, Edouard, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne Blanche* II (Paris, 1903), 353ff.; Tobolka, *op. cit.*, I, 187ff.

[17] See chapter VI, "Polonia farà da se (1857-1863)" of W. Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Polen seit dessen Teilungen (1795-1914)*, (Berlin, 1917). This German work is not identical with the previously noticed Polish work of the same author

[18] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 367ff.; cf. also B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 1937), p. 60ff.

[19] Benes, *Umaby o Slovanstvi* (Prague, 1947), p. 79ff. C. Oulnet, *Tchaadaev* etc., p.

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Theoretical Slavophilism was influenced by poorly understood western thought—Rousseau, Hegel, and Fichte—into paths of unrealistic and unhistorical grotesquerie and then grafted onto Uvarov's threefold motto of nationality, orthodoxy and autocracy.[20]

It is a simple axiom of diplomatic history that a great and powerful state does not interest itself "benevolently" in other and lesser peoples unless it either needs their help or hopes to profit from that "benevolence." The change in the momentum of Russian Slavophilism in the late fifties of the nineteenth century clearly illustrates this axiom. Before 1855 Russia was too strong to need the support or loyalty of the western Slavs, and her leadership reasoned that her strength lay in the centralized autocratic system. As the system was regarded as good *per se* it was proper to support it elsewhere, in Prussia, in the Hapsburg Empire and, with qualifications, even in Turkey. But the Crimean War revealed considerable weaknesses in her state structure, and Vienna's affections had shifted to the enemies of Russia. Under these circumstances help, psychological at least, was welcome. Panslavism, it was obviously reasoned, might actually have its points, particularly since most of the western Slavs were in the Hapsburg Empire anyway, and a little discreet discontent there might pay diplomatic dividends. This period is thus a decisive period in the history of the theatrical property known as Panslavism.[21]

The Benevolent Committee actively wooed the South Slavs with appeals to their Orthodoxy, developing the thesis that West and East were irrevocably separate, that Slav, Eastern and Orthodox were and of right ought to be synonymous with Russia. Then came the January 1863 revolution of the Poles, put down by the butcher Muraviev with brutal ruthlessness. The Benevolent Slavic Committee was able to convince Russian opinion that it was all the Poles' fault, that their Catholicism blinded them to the truth of their Slavic heritage and made them guilty of the "great betrayal,"[22] but after Muraviev the western and southern Slavs were farther than ever from accepting the doctrines of Muscovite Slavophilism.[23]

408, would call this movement "the second slavophilism." See also M. Prelog, *Pod Slovanu do Moskvy r. 1867* (Prague, 1931), p. 4.

20 See T. G. Masaryk, *Rusko a Evropa* I (Prague, 1930), 406ff. The English edition, *The Spirit of Russia* (London, 1919), was based on the German text which Masaryk revised for the 1930 Czech edition.

21 P. N. Milioukov has a chapter in his *La Mouvement intellectuel russe* (Paris, 1918) p. 377ff., entitled "La décomposition du slavophilisme" in which his explanation of the processes of Russian thought from *ca.* 1848 to the publication of Danilevsky's *Russland und Europa* is treated mystically. Any resemblance between his discussion and the realities of Russia's changed position in European politics after 1855-56 is not even coincidental.

22 Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

23 Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen*, p. 223ff., and contemporary literature there cited.

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Among the South Slavs a considerable element of enlightened opinion, particularly the younger generation,[24] supported the Polish revolutionaries, and among the leaders there was much openly pro-British and anti-Russian expression. Nevertheless the dominant sentiment, both among Serbs and Croats in the 'sixties was one of nationalist aspirations and, as between other Slavic peoples, benevolent neutrality.[25]

Palacký remarked in 1863 that "Russian Tsardom was not based on Slavic principles but upon an amalgam of Mongolian and German principles."[26] The fact that European opinion had largely turned against Russia finally came home to many of the Russian Slavophils and a natural desire to repair the damage by allaying the suspicions of non-Russian Slavs soon made its appearance. In line with this feeling the Slavic Committee and the recently founded (1863) Society of Friends of the Natural Sciences projected an Ethnographic Congress to meet in Moscow in the summer of 1867.[27] Invitations were broadcast to learned societies throughout the Slavic world. Between the invitation in 1866 and the following summer several events transpired to give the Congress more potential significance. Austria had lost another war—this time to Prussia—and, within the Empire, the Compromise *(Ausgleich)* which divided the Empire into two parts, Hungary and Austria, had become law. The Slavs of the Empire were thus not only split, but put under their enemies, Magyars and Germans. Their long-standing aspirations for an equal share in a federative Empire were roughly dashed.[28] The outlook was black for the western Slavic peoples and it is not surprising that, with the exception of the Poles, the invitations to the Ethnographic Congress at Moscow were eagerly accepted.

In the meantime Ivan Aksakov, enthusiastic over the implications of the visit of so many leading personalities among the western Slavs to the Congress, constituted himself the propagandist of the Exposition, and many editorials in his journal *Den*, beginning with February 1867, concerned the Slav question. He emphasized the bonds between the Russians and other Slavic peoples, and expressed confidence that they had only to know each other to reject foreign, non-Slav control and join forces with

[24] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

[25] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

[26] Palacký, *Politisches Vermächtnis* (Prague, 1872), p. 26, quoting himself in 1863.

[27] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 27ff.

[28] Louis Léger recounts the opinion he met on a trip among the South Slavs in 1868, when their participation and hopes in the Moscow Congress were frankly explained to him. See his *La Panslavisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), p. 232ff., reprinted from *La revue moderne* of April, 1868.

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their motherland.[29] His line was followed by most of the Moscow journalists.

In Prague the *Národní Noviny*, the organ of the Young Czech party, avowed openly the political aims in the minds of the Czechi representatives:

> "We make not effort to conceal the fact that the Moscow Exhibition has for us who are going not only philological or ethnographic interest, but a significance deeply political. We are not responsible for that significance; rather those who have inaugurated dualism in Austria and have endangered the independence of the Czech crown and even of the Czech people... those who have turned the Slovak nation over to the mercies of the Magyars, those finally who are recklessly sacrificing the heroic Croatian people to the greed of the Magyar magnates."[30]

The majority of the Czech delegates, though men of intellectual and often scientific attainments, were yet men active in political life. The delegates of the South Slavs were exclusively non-political. Bishop Strossmayer and Franji Rački, who were especially invited, did not join the delegation, though the Bishop gave the expedition his active support. Ljudevit Gaj, the leading Croat nationalist journalist, went to Moscow, but was unaccountably quiet.[31]

In the realization that the Poles would not be represented, Palacký and Rieger were anxious to show their consideration of Polish sensitiveness and went to Paris to explain their reasons for making the trip when the Poles refused to go. Prince Adam Czartoryski and Andrew Zamojski urged the Czechs not to go, and the son of Adam Mickiewicz wrote them an impassioned letter begging them not to attend the Congress. Another special delegation of representative Polish emigrés waited on them to the same intent.[32]

Opened by the Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich on April 23, the Congress was ostensibly an academic and scientific meeting, but railway passes had been given the foreign guests. The western Slavs, on their way to the Congress, crossed the Russian frontier at Granice (i. e. in Polish Silesia) on May 16 and on the 20th reached St. Petersburg.[33] On the way receptions and entertainment were provided by a number of municipalities, though the government took no official action in the matter. Enthusiasm was unbounded. The Czechs and the Serbs were received by Gorchakov

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[29] Aksakov, I. S., *Slavyanskii vopros* (Moscow, 1886), pp. 117-122.

[30] *Národní Noviny*, 1867, no. 11, quoted by Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[31] Fric, J. W., *Die Kehrseite der slavischen Wallfahrt nach Russland* (Prague, 1867), *passim*.

[32] A considerable literature has accumulated on Gaj's trip and activities. See Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 43ff. and literature there cited.

[33] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 68ff.

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in separate audiences and greeted with honeyed and unintelligible words. The Tsar received 20 of the leaders of the various delegations in Tsarskoe Selo on May 26. He is reported to have said to them: "May God hearken soon to all your prayers," a hope which thus relieved the Tsar of any further need for action or hearkening. But he called them his "blood brothers here on native Slav soil" and thereby caused a sensation in western Slav capitals.[34] There were copious banquets and eloquent speeches by learned professors and publicists that left no room for doubt that the messianic hope of close Slavic collaboration was well on the way to realization.[35] They were so busy collaborating that there was barely time to visit the elaborate ethnographic and archeological exhibits for which the Congress had been called. The ghost of absent Poland did discreetly appear at several of the more formal occasions, but it was almost dispelled by confident and urbane diplomacy, which naturally deceived no one. The meeting made a deep impression upon everyone present. The Benevolent Committee was profusely congratulated for its felicitous initiative. But very few felt that much had been accomplished. Gorchakov apologetically stayed aloof, save to opine that the Czechs were apparently working for the King of Prussia. General Peter Suvalov acidly remarked that the pilgrims were pursuing a phantom, and the Austrian minister, Revertera, was told that the Russian court regarded the whole spectacle as foolish.[36] In the western Slavic press reports were, in a slight majority, critical and skeptical. The Moscow Congress may have been the high point in public tribute to the numerous concepts in the center and at the periphery of Slavophilism, but it left much disillusionment in its wake. The Poles were disgruntled at the Czechs for participating against their expressed wishes. The Austrian government had, or affected to have, more than grave doubts of the sincerity of the Czech leaders in their devotion to Austro-Slavism, and even the Catholic clergy saw in the expedition a leaning to Orthodoxy and a defection from Catholicism. Within the Austrian Empire the large Slavic public had lost confidence in the political sagacity of their leaders. There was, of course, after the Congress, not the slightest trace of implementation of all the high-sounding resolutions calling for increased cultural reciprocity between the general Slavic peoples.

About 1870 the vaguely variegated sensitivities and aspirations fo-

[34] Kazbunda, K., *Pouť Čechů do Moskvy 1867 a rakouská diplomacie* (Prague, 1924), p. 63, and M. D. Miličević, Etnografska izložba a slovenska sastanak u Moskvi 1867 (Belgrade, 1884), p. 18ff.

[35] The classically bitter report on the Congress is that by Julian Klaczko, "Le Congrès de Moscou et la propagande panslaviste" in *Revue des deux mondes* LXI (1867), 132-181. Klaczko, a native of Wilno, had been the editor of the Paris *Wiadomości Polskie*, which ceased publication in 1861. A much more valid short account is that of Louis Léger in *Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), pp. 211-249.

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cussing around the two general concepts of Slavism and Russian expansionism began to coalesce and crystallize. In that year there appeared a small book by General Rostislav A. Fadeyev under the title: *Thoughts on the Eastern Question.*[37] It had passed the censor in 1869. Fadeyev, as a soldier, was primarily interested in strengthening Russia's strategic position and in pointing the way to achieving her natural strategic aims—the control of the Straits. To him the Hapsburg Empire was the principal enemy, and not England and France. As the peoples of the polyglot Empire were mostly Slav, Russia should obviously take them under her wing, and eventually head an all-Slav state. This was Panslavism, clearly put, for Russia's political benefit.

A much more radical and thorough treatment appeared by separate chapters in the periodical *Tsarja* in 1869 and, revised, in book form in 1871: Nikolai J. Danilevski's *Russia and Europe.* He was a trained botanist and geographer, and his broad approach covered questions of race, religion, climate, politics, and strategy. Because of its thoroughness and easily comprehensible conclusions, it became immediately the Bible of Panslavism.[38] Danilevski posited a deep-rooted antagonism between West, that is the Latin and the German, Catholicism and Protestantism, commercialism and pointless diversity, and East, that is the Slav, the orthodox and the ordered universal. Russia had a destiny to realize. She should save the smaller and weaker Slavic peoples from the curse of europeanization. The Poles had indeed gone farthest in that sinister direction, hence the great tension between Russia and the Poles. In their case Russia had had to be severe, but it was properly not with their Slavic nature but with its europeanized, Catholic perversion. The Poles should realize that Russia had had to discipline them for their own salvation. To Danilevski Panslavism, so far as it was good, was Panrussism.

It would be difficult to say which of these two works, Fadeyev on the Eastern Question or Danilevski's *Russia and Europe* had the more in-

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[36] Revertera, on the other hand, had been instructed by Beust in May to give the whole matter no unnecessary notice. The two governments affected not to count it as of any political significance. See Kazbunda, *Pouť Čechů do Moskvy,* p. 57. Revertera was recalled the next year by Beust and the Tsar told his successor, Albin Vetsera, that he disliked the whole incident and regretted that it had occurred. "Russia is large enough for me; I want nothing from my neighbor" and disavowed any slightest desire to entice away from the Emperor any of his Slav subjects. See Kazbunda, *op. cit.,* p. 121f.

[37] English translation by T. Michell (London, 1871), *Opinion on the Eastern Question.* See also Fischel, *op. cit.,* p. 400ff.

[38] German translation by Karl Nötsch (Berlin, 1920), somewhat abridged, *Russland und Europa.* See further Beneš, *Uvahy,* pp. 98-107, and the recent study of Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa,* where the focus is on the relation of Danilevski to the church. On p. 238 he calls Danilevski "der eigentliche Systematiker der panslavistischen Weltanschauung."

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fluence. Their arguments were so dynamic in their implications that together they are a landmark in European psycho-political history. Panrussism now had a divinely appointed mission and a program for political implementation.[39] Those whose interests lay in cultural exchange with their western Slav brothers no longer felt unsupported, and those who had before been politically Pan-Russian could not rejoice in the moral support of the intelligentsia. It was a perfect coalescence of ideals and interests. There is no wonder that Gorchakov, the foreign minister, felt very gratified about the jelling of enlightened public opinion. He had shared the distrust felt by the court at cultural Slavophilism, so vocal at the Moscow Congress. It implied equality among the various Slavic peoples. Russian policy would be much happier if Russia's "leadership" and of course "benevolent" hegemony were generally accepted. It is hardly necessary to mention that the acceptance of Russian Orthodoxy—no longer Greek Orthodoxy—was by now assumed as a *sine qua non* of the whole Slavic program. It is not difficult to see how the atmosphere created by the wide circulation of these two sensational books may have convinced Gorchakov and the court that Ignatyev's reports and suggestions from Constantinople correctly represented the proper policy to be pursued—at least in the interests of Russia.[40] We are here far removed from any semblance of the Panslav sentiments of Kollár, or the Austro-Slavism of the Prague Congress of 1848 or even from the implications of Slav cultural reciprocity so fervently expressed by most of the leaders at the Moscow Congress of 1867. We are dealing with realistic political opportunism which makes use of the slogans and stage illusions evoked by romantic or even philosophical Panslavism. Gorchakov and Ignatyev and certainly—and indeed avowedly—Fadeyev, were quite aware of the political semantics fluttering around the words Slavophilism, Panslavism, Slavic solidarity. The fact that the words sent shivers up and down the spines of western diplomats and at the same time thrilled the Russian people and some western Slavs could only please the anti-western party at the Tsar's court.

In 1874 an Archeological Congress was held in Kiev under the auspices of the Moscow Archeological Society. It was sparsely attended by non-Russian Slavs, about a dozen in all, out of a total of 206 delegates. Several unpleasant incidents at this Congress showed that the resentments and tensions between, particularly, Poles, Russians and Ukrainians, were

[39] See Lednicki, *art. cit.*, p. 845ff., and Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 75ff. Feldman, *op. cit.*, says bluntly: "Unter den Russen vollzieht sich nach dem Jahre 1870 eine Umwandlung der alten slavophilenBewegung in einen selbstbewussten politischen Imperialismus."

[40] On Ignatyev see Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 73ff., and his article in *Slavic Review* XI (1932), 343- , 569-

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deep and lasting. Slavic solidarity was certainly not advanced by this meeting.[41]

It is true that the Bulgarian atrocities precipitated a resurgence, in Russia herself, of the emotional index of the Panslav idea, but basic political realities were not thereby at stake. The participation of Russian soldiers as volunteers in the Serbian army could not obscure the fact that Russia already saw clearly that Turkey was no longer a major antagonist. Indeed the Balkan wars of 1876-78 were only an incident which, if anything, confirmed the political Panslavists (*lege* Panrussians) of the necessity to consolidate their political program and its psychological and moral bases for use in a coming struggle with enemies much stronger than the Ottoman Empire. The Russian campaign of 1877-78 could have been lifted bodily from Fadeyev or Danilevski.

The fact that Gorchakov and Ignatyev had to retire from public life after the Treaty of Berlin has several interesting if not ironic aspects. What must have played a large part in their downfall was the fact that their aggressive Panslavism or Pan-Russism or Russian nationalism had gained less for Russia at Berlin than was popularly expected.[42] Yet they themselves, and here lies the irony, were substantially responsible for inducing Russian opinion to expect so much. The significant fact is the generality of the adoption of the Russian nationalistic thesis, and, in retrospect, the large-scale perversion of the thesis of Slav reciprocity. What, less than a half century before, seen from Paris or London, had been a cloud, small as a man's hand, on the eastern horizon, now seemed a swirling thunderhead, about to loose a torrent and a tempest. This menace bore the label Panslavism. No wonder the west shivered at the word. Yet it was by this time in no sense Panslav but pure Russian expansionism.

It would be of interest to examine the trends of thought among the western Slavs in these years. It was among them that the ideas of Slav reciprocity had first arisen. The great Croat leader, Bishop Strossmayer, had not modified his stand in favor of a South Slav federation and cultural reciprocity with the lands of Orthodoxy. Professor Jaroslav Jagić and George Daničić, the renowned South Slav philologists, both advocated a union of the Croats, Serbs and Bulgars. Nowhere among these leaders do we detect any desire to join a larger Slavic world led by Russia, or any urge to make Orthodoxy the common Slav faith.[43] Their insistence on their cultural and political independence constitutes an emphatic rejection of the

41 Léger, *Le Panslavisme* . . , pp. 242-249. Léger was present at the Congress.

42 Gorchakov's last years have been frequently discussed. See in brief B. Nolde, *L'Alliance franco-russe* (Paris, 1936), pp. 199ff. and 209ff.

43 Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 347ff.; see also R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question* (London, 1911), p. 126ff.

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so-called Panslavism emanating from Moscow in these decades. The fact that, under Magyar rule, any move by South Slavs or Slovaks to cultivate their native language or culture was proceeded against as "Panslavism" and consequently regarded as high treason[44] is obviously irrelevant, because erroneous in its factual bases. Palacký in his *Politisches Vermächtnis* observed that he had come to the conclusion that a Russian universal monarchy would mean "violent compulsion, absolute subjugation and enslavement of all civilized Europe, the suppression and suffocation of every free and noble thought and aspiration of the human race." He added that he thought that the enlightened minds of Russia would likewise regard the expansion of Russia westward as a misfortune.[45] He might not have counted Dostoyevski among the enlightened minds of Russia.

The Poles, crushed between Russian and Prussian calculated oppression, sought solace from their dire despair in their own literature and art. It was all that was left them. Memories of the Russian soldiery of Muraviev certainly estopped any warmth of feeling toward the Slavs they knew the most about from personal experience.[46] The less they had to do with the Russians the better. Orthodoxy was Russian and therefore they clung to their Roman Catholicism with deepening gratitude. The Poles were grateful also to Austria for the relative freedom they enjoyed in Cracow and Galicia, and used it to fortify their nationalism in literature and science.[47]

By the end of the century, whether because of absorption into a more potent and definitely programmatic Russian expansionism, or because its vagaries had repelled the western and more rational Slavs, or because the anti-Panslav campaign from Berlin, Paris and London had been effective, or because Russian imperialism was not too successful, the Panslavism of the Prague Congress of 1848, of the Moscow Slavophils, or the Moscow Congress of 1867 or even of Ignatyev, was dead. It might be more exact to say that the ghost had been laid.

The subsidence of the noble sentiments of Slavic reciprocity, of "interslavism," did not mean, however, that the scarecrow of Panslavism was not still usable. Eduard Beneš recently put these developments in urbane terms:

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[44] Cf. the Vakanović memorandum of 1872, quoted by Palacký, *Politisches Vermächtnis*, p. 13; cf. also Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 353f. It would appear that the Magyars were the most consistently fervent believers in Panslavism. At any rate they thought every Slovak was a Panslav. The record contains many instances of such fantasy almost too ludicrous to believe. The most fantastic aspect of this complex is its literal truth. See, e. g. Thomas Capek, *The Slovaks of Hungary; Slavs and Panslavism* (New York, 1906), pp. 47-52.

[45] *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

[46] Kucharzewski, Jan, *Origins of Modern Russia* (New York, 1948), p. 349ff.

[47] Chlebowski, Bronislas, *La litterature polonaise au XIXe siecle* (Paris, 1933), chs. XXVIII and XXIX; and see Feldman, *op. cit.*, chapter IX, "Aufleben der Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen im Zusammenhange mit modernen sozialen Ideen."

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"Panslavism then, up to 1905, solved no question fully, it failed to attain its aims, and could not be transferred into the field of politics in any concrete form. Finally it became a synonym for Tsarist Russian nationalism and as such, in the form of a political doctrine, could only be prejudicial to all concerned: to the Russians, to the other Slavs, to Europe and to the world. It was harmful to the Slavs because, above and beyond the fact that it was in political fact in great measure a fantasy, it was used and misused against them by their opponents to such an extent that not only the Magyars and the Germans but all of western Europe saw in it a real danger and frequently, because of it, opposed them even where the Slavs were in the right. Against us Czechoslovaks it was for instance used during the first world war and here and there one heard echoes of it even during the second."[48]

The year 1905 brought a marked change, not only in Russia's external prestige and her internal constitutional structure, but also in the attitude of the western and southern Slavs toward the whole question of their own future and the relations between them and Tsarist Russia. Whereas for over a half century, since at least the Prague Slavic Congress of 1848, they had consciously or unconsciously looked to powerful Russia for moral or physical support, now, that Russia had been militarily humbled and they found their own strength growing and their interests in their western connections in a more satisfactory perspective, the prospect of a future independent of Russia was not unpleasing. The vestiges of admiration for Russia that remained clouded but did not basically alter the vision of the future that opened out before them.

As for the Poles, who had never accepted the thesis of Russian leadership, the harsh campaign for russification under Alexander III only increased their hatred of everything Russia stood for and their determination to maintain their separate polonism.[49] Among the Czechs and the Slovaks the "realism" of Masaryk, by which he had meant simply that they should trust in their own moral strength and the logic of national development in order to win out over an already corrupt, artificial and doomed monarchy, had made much headway and was destined to capture the dominant place in the people's thought. The South Slavs had not forgotten the disillusionment brought by the Congress of Berlin and had quickly adjusted themselves to the thesis that they should and could make substantial gains in cultural and political autonomy on their own initiative in the Balkan ambit.[50] The coup of 1903 in Belgrade furthermore opened vistas of actual independence from the Hapsburg monarchy. All the western Slavs had sensed vividly for a full quarter century that Russia had been increasingly

[48] Beneš, *Uvahy o Slovanství*, p. 127f.
[49] Cf. M. Zdziechowski, *Wpływy rosyjskie na duszę polską* (Cracow, 1920), p. 53ff.
[50] Cf. E. Denis, *La Grande Serbie* (Paris, 1920), p. 121ff.

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disinterested, indeed bored, with them and their problems. What fleeting political *rapprochements* took place at top levels did not touch real public opinion save to confirm the general belief that arrangements between dynasts, foreign ministers and such like were cynical and opportunistic. In this case at least it would have been difficult to prove this instinctive judgment erroneous.

On a basis of these psycho-political developments among the Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and along her borders the decade between 1905 and the outbreak of the war of 1914 witnessed the rise to dominance of what is usually described as Neo-Slavism.[51] The leading and best known exponent and expositor of this short-lived but significant movement was the Czech politician, Dr. Karel Kramář. The essence of this movement, fundamentally indigenous and unconnected with Russia or the accidental fact that Russia was largely Slavic, was an effort to counterweight Central Europe and the Balkans against the aggressive expansion of Germany in every field of political, economic and social life in that area. Seeing that Austria-Hungary was weakening in the face of the steady pressure from the north, the Neo-Slavs even advocated support of the Empire on condition that it be federalized. If Austria-Hungary could be weaned away from Germany and the Triple Alliance broken up, Russia and Austria-Hungary could draw closer together. Pan-Germanism would then be blocked and the western Slavs could move and have their being in this larger atmosphere. Along these lines there was even, *mirabile dictu*, talk of a Polish-Russian *rapprochement*. Late in 1905 Swiatkowski, an energetic Russian journalist, proclaimed that the German danger made Slavic cooperation absolutely necessary,[52] and he proceeded to beat the drums for a broad-gauged campaign to bring it about—among the Sokols, in the press, by congresses, by cultural and social relations on every level. He envisaged a political union of some sort, but specifically an economic and customs union to which the non-Slavic states of Central Europe should also be invited. In the next two years the idea grew that it was time for all the Slavs to get together again, as in 1848 and 1867, to further their mutual interests. The leader of the movement in Russia was Lt. Gen. Volodimirov, whose recent retirement left him with time on his hands. He enlisted some publicists and men of letters of a poetic cast of mind, travelled to Warsaw, Cracow and Prague, where he found other optimists.

The second Slavic Congress of Prague, which met in July, 1908, was the result of this agitation. It was attended by representatives of most, though

[51] Bessel, *op. cit.*, p. 134ff. The most complete discussion of this movement is the collaborative work, *Slovanstvo. Obraz jeho minulosti a přítomnosti* (Prague, 1912), with a foreword by Dr. Kramář.

[52] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 507f.

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not all, of the Slavic peoples in Russia, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkans.[53] The slogans were unity, solidarity, reciprocity, equality and unification, though few if any of the delegates knew precisely what they meant. Roman Dmowski, the leader of the Polish delegation, ostentatiously shook hands with Krasowski, the head of the Russian delegation,[54] and the whole Congress echoed for days with the miracle that had been wrought. It all sounded like the ominous approach of peace and good will. But the fact is that the whole idea behind the Congress was based on a completely untenable assumption: that the interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary did not conflict.[55] It can only be charitably said that the organizers of the Congress had, in a greater degree and with even less excuse than their predecessors of 1848 and 1867, failed to think through their program, its logic and its practicability. Questions which the literate man on the street in Prague, Belgrade or Warsaw knew had to be faced either did not appear on the agenda or were greeted by bland smiles and silence. Two further facts highlight the absurdity of the meeting. The old Panrussians, now benignly veneered with liberalism, were in control of the Russian delegation and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that all their vocal support of the new Slavism was utterly cynical. Neo-Slavism in general and the Prague Congress in particular never aroused any enthusiasm among the Serbs. Roman Dmowski told Beneš in 1917 that his aims at the Congress of 1908 were solely the independence of Poland, and in no sense Slav.[56]

The roseate aura of Slavic amity and hope engendered by the Congress lasted less than three months. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and the hopes of the western Slavs for an acceptable *modus vivendi* within the then political framework were rudely dashed. The next year it became evident that the promises made to the Poles in Russia in 1905 of modest recognition of their nationalistic feelings were valueless and that reaction was again in the saddle in St. Petersburg.[57]

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[53] Léger, *Le Panslavisme* . . ., p. 271ff.; Beneš, *op. cit.*, 139ff. A rich source of documentation is the printed (but not published) record of the trial of Kramář, Alois Rašín, V. Červinka and Josef Zamazal, which went on from Dec. 6, 1915, to June 3, 1916. Letters, documents and testimony of all sorts on the whole movement, including the various congresses, are printed *in extenso*. See further Paul Milyukov, "World War and Slavonic Policy" in *Slavonic Review* VI (1927-28), 268-290, particularly interesting in its critique of Kramář's ideas and Beneš' opposition to them.

[54] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 149. Dmowski published this same year his *Niemcy, Rosja i Kwestja Polska* (Lwów) in which he argued that Poland's principal enemy was Germany and that it was to the interest of the Poles and the other western Slavs to support Russia.

[55] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 155f.

[56] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 154f.

[57] One of the resolutions passed at the Prague congress to which most weight was

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Yet there were still pleasantly optimistic souls among the Slavic intellectuals. Another Congress was called for Sofia in 1910. It makes even more fantastic reading than those that preceded it. Dr. Kramář was frequently eloquent. No Pole was present as a delegate. The Russian delegation was almost exclusively conservative. No Ukrainian representative came and the Bulgarian Tsar was ostentatiously absent from Sofia during the Congress. This was the last Slavic Congress before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.[58] Almost everybody save the leading Czech slavophil Dr. Kramář left Sofia fully aware that he had witnessed the *rigor mortis* of an ailing phantom—indeed a cooling thought. The Neo-Slav movement had had a short life and an inglorious end. If it accomplished anything it proved that Slavism as a gospel, so long at least as there was an Austro-Hungarian Empire, had insufficient grounding in the tissues of international relations to have the slightest influence upon the trend of events in Central and Eastern Europe.

It is a commonplace among German historians and analysts of the origins of the first world war that it was essentially a defensive struggle by Germandom against Slavdom. Bethmann-Hollweg made the statement early, and so weighty a study as Fischel's *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg* is avowedly devoted to this thesis. But it will hardly bear careful examination. There were Germans on one side—there was a majority of Slavs on the other. But that is more accidental than essential. Along with many Slavic-German issues there was in fact a greater number of issues completely unrelated to the Slavic-German question which in the inevitable logic of history would have had to be decided completely regardless of ethnics and culture. After the war, out of which arose three new or revised west Slavic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the principal inter-Slav questions were solved and there was hardly a whisper of Panslavism. Bolshevik Russia, emphasizing its multinationality and its supranational foundations, in the early years at least, had no interest in Slavic countries *per se*, and Panslavism, Slavophilism, Neo-Slavism and even Pan-Russism became historical curiosities, objects of antiquarian research.

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attached was to the effect that St. Petersburg should be the meeting place of the next Pan-Slav conference the following year. Léger (*op. cit.*, p. 278) says: "l'on se sépara en se donnant rendez-vous pour l'année suivante à St. Petersbourg. Ce rendez-vous ne devait pas se réaliser." S. B. Fay, *Origins of the World War* (New York, 1929), 401, and B. E. Schmitt, *Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 248, mention the congress in the summer of 1909 and the circular letter sent to Slav organizations in the Balkans. The contradiction is only apparent. There was such a conference and such a secret circular, but very few South Slavs attended the meeting. See dispatch from Count Brockdorff-Rantzau (German chargé d'affaires in Vienna) to Bethmann-Hollweg of July 25, 1909, in *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, 844f.

[58] See the *Kramář-Prozess*, pp. 402-407, for interesting sidelights on the meeting.

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This should cause no surprise. Whenever in the past these national groups had existed as independent states there had not been any discernible urge for exceptional collaboration on a basis of their consanguinity. They had pursued their particular needs, in the same way as France, Italy and Spain, also related by history, language, religion and ethnic bonds, had, throughout their history, tended toward particularism and strenuously rejected any centripetal pressures. It would seem reasonable to allow Slavic peoples to act according to a pattern assumed to be rational and even enlightened farther west.

The Little Entente was, quite accidentally, two-thirds Slav. Its collapse was precipitated by the early defection of Yugoslavia, one of the Slav thirds. The Balkan Entente followed no noticeable Slavic pattern.

The aggressive war of 1939 was variously advertised. It was directed against any people that objected to being nazified, Slav, Teuton, Baltic or Latin. The fourth partition of Poland, shared in equally by Russia and Germany, made it abundantly clear that it was not a war against Bolshevism or of German against Slav. It would have been difficult to arouse among western Slavs any enthusiasm for the Slav idea from August 23, 1939 to June 22, 1941.

At this point it is possible to draw some deductions from the history of the variations in Slav feeling. The sense of Slavic community weakened, or perhaps more accurately shuffled into the unrealistic or academic empyrean, in times of peace. Under stress and strain or in times of crisis Slavophilism became again, with the limitations of the moment, an active force.[59] But all wars, the ultimate in national interest, have acted as rapid solvents of these fond dreams. This failure of the idea to stand any real test will explain why we use the term phantom or illusion of the whole concept.

From 1941 on one heard much of Slavic solidarity. There were All-Slav congresses at Moscow in August 1941, April 1942 and May 1943. The Russian speakers emphatically repudiated the political Panslavism and Pan-Russism of the nineteenth century and appealed "for the union of all Slav strength in the struggle against Hitlerism."[60] There was to be a unity of equals with equals, all bound together in a happy family of democratic peoples. Thereafter Slavic committees sprang up and Slavic congresses were held in London, Detroit and Pittsburgh, and in 1945 and following years, in Sofia, Belgrade, Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw. The themes of all these meetings followed the same lines: rejoicing in new Slav unity

[59] Cf. A. Mousset, *Le Monde Slave* (2nd. ed., Paris, 1947), p. 385.

[60] Vl. Ozmanin, Secretary of All Slav Committee, in May, 1943, quoted by Mousset *op. cit.*

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under the leadership of Soviet Russia. Whereas the pre-1914 congresses were usually gatherings of professors and publicists, and the realist politicians generally abstained, the post-1941 gatherings were almost exclusively made up of politicians and poets. The trained professorate was in a noticeable minority. It would perhaps be superfluous to quote many of these political leaders on the subject of Slav unity, but it would not be difficult to discover a marvelous, perhaps inspired, unanimity.

There were numerous speeches in all the western Slav capitals which emphasized "the Slavic bloc, directed by the great Russian people"[61] "for the protection of their freedom and democracy."[62] There is no room for question as to what was meant. The signing of every new treaty, of commerce, mutual defense or cultural friendship, was accompanied by headlines, radio propaganda and ministerial banquets, in all of which inter-Slavic devotion was lauded with profound conviction. Ceremonial visits of chiefs of state were exchanged, there were many elaborate parades and happy reunions. In between, naturally, there were visits to Moscow. M. Georgiev, the Bulgarian President, remarked, on landing in Moscow on Jan. 7, 1946: "I am happy to be in the fortress of the Slavic peoples which, thanks to the wise direction of Generalissimo Stalin, has become the hope of all democratic humanity." M. Vishinsky then visited Sofia.

The years 1946 and 1947 brought electoral and diplomatic victories to Russia. As all the Slavs were now safely enjoying their Slavic solidarity, it was no longer necessary to emphasize Slavism. Marxian Socialism was a more comprehensive concept into which Magyars, Rumanians, Austrians, Germans and Balts could conveniently be made to fit. We have therefore to remark upon the relative silence of western Slavic spokesmen on the subject of Slavic solidarity in the years 1947 and 1948. That stage illusion was no longer necessary, at least in so urgent a fashion as before. On the other hand it would be incorrect to say that it had been completely withdrawn from circulation. The enforcement of Russian language instruction in the schools, the extended tours of Russian artists, authors, scientists and athletes throughout all the Slavic countries, the dominant place in areas of cultural expression, education, science, press, radio, screen and stage, given to the products of Russia, all reveal the underlying plan. It should not be overlooked, furthermore, that the Orthodox Church has, with the support of the Kremlin, been incorporated into the program of implementation of the plan with considerable success in at least Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine. Whereas under Tsarist rule the trilogy of

[61] Quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p. 237, from Zdeněk Nejedlý, Czechoslovak Minister of Education.

[62] Nikolov, President of Slav Committee, at Sofia, quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p 262f.

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nationalism, orthodoxy and autocracy was the slogan reserved for Russia herself, one is justified in remarking that Russian nationalism has now become Slavic nationalism or Slavic unity, Orthodoxy is being encouraged outside Russia, and of autocracy throughout the western Slavic states there appears to be quite adequate evidence. We have, on the other hand, little positive proof that thus far the various Slavic peoples love each other more than they did, say in 1860, 1890 or 1935. Titoism rather speaks for itself, and the great popularity of Gomulka in Poland would indicate, if there were any need, the continuity of Polish separatism from time immemorial. A thousand years of determined and consistent western orientation and nationalism are not obliterated in a decade of government by loud speakers, force and fear.

As we look back over the last century of Slav thought, interaction and political mutuality, several broad lines of change strike our notice. In 1848 Slavophil enthusiasm stemmed mostly from within the polyglot Hapsburg monarchy. A century later, not only has this Empire, officially a bulwark of Germanism with all its westward leanings, disappeared, but its place and much more has been taken by the heirs of the Tsars. In 1848 Slavic thought was largely centered on cultural and moral reciprocity. A century later the Slavic nations, under the direction of Russia (excepting, for the moment, Yugoslavia), constitute a solid and ruthlessly integrated political, economic and military unity, more tightly welded with each passing day. But nothing seemed more sure, and indeed necessary, in 1848 than the Hapsburg Empire. Yet that imperial idea was in actuality soon after 1848 rejected by those who had theretofore felt it to be necessary. Under similar circumstances there is every reason to think that the present, stronger than imperial, concept will be rejected. Of their own volition the western Slavs have never in their long history shown any general desire to become part of an inclusive Slav empire. They have at various times experienced the imperial idea only to repudiate it. Nor, in spite of present conditions, is there any evidence that the people of these nations have lost their historic particularism. All the verifiable evidence is in the opposite direction. These peoples have lived long and are wise from bitter experience, a teacher whose lessons last longer than those of ministers of propaganda. Nowhere is the common man more anxious to claim citizenship of the world than in Central Europe, where the western Slavs for much more than this past century have been exposed to the repeated appearances of, only to reject, the phantom of Panslavism.

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